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Historical Background and Western Attitudes
The history of agitations to impose economic Sanctions on South Africa
is as old as independent Africa itself. Following Sharpville, there were
widespread discussions on the desirability of the economic isolation of
racist South Africa with the aim of forcing the Republic to adopt social
and political policies conforming to internationally acceptable standards
of moral behaviour. As such, international condemnation of racism in
South Africa has always been on the forefront. The initial idea was to
1impose economic sanctions backed by a complete blockade. However, this 
early notion of pressure soon died down, afeature which characterized
the late 1960's and 1970's.
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Much as the initial idea failed to achieve comprehensive implementation, 
the whole issue of sanctions has continued to be internationally appreciated 
as an important strategy for bringing about genuine reform and eventual 
decolonization in South Africa. The 1960's have seen a more fervent revival 
of calls for sanctions. This has mainly been due to changing political 
configurations in Southern Africa. The decolonialization of Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe made South Africa the only remaining bastion of western 
imperialism and settler supremacy. For the first time world opinion 
focussed on racist South Africa, much to the embarrassment of her western 
allies. For the first time Southern African nationalists were able to 
combine and mobilize world opinion towards the ostracization of the South 
African regime. The birth of the Frontline group of states, the emergence 
of Zimbabwe and the eventual regional reorganization in the form of the 
South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) all helped 
focuss attention on South Africa and ferment a regional struggle against
N
imperialism.
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Early as well as present proposals for sanctions have been confronted 
by the reluctance of some leading European nations which are at the same­
time leading investors and business operators in South Africa. Western 
arguments against sanctions have always been basically a reflection of 
self interest although humanitarian grounds have always been used for 
legitimization. The importance of South Africa's impressive mineral wealth 
has always been seen as crucial to western imposition of sanctions on South
Africa. The United States Geological Survey has identified twenty seven
2
minerals as critical in industrialized societies. Eleven reserves of 
these are found in South Africa. The United States consumes kS% of South 
Africa's chromium, 15% of manganese, 72% of vanadium and 67% of platinum. 
The prevailing fear therefore in most western nations is that if the South 
African supplys are cut, the west may increasingly depend on the Soviet 
union for supplys. In this vein, South Africa is viewed as a regional 
power which should be drawn to the western block.
In recent years the commitment of American and European firms in
South Africa has grown substantially. U.S. investors alone increased by-
13% in 1981-^ The 1,200 British companies, followed by 375 American and
350 West German firms with a total foreign investment of R30 million in
1982 indicate . the pervasive nature of.western imperialism in the South
'African economy. Thus Southern Africa attempts.to combat South African
/
imperialism must recognize its western anchorage. The persuations directed 
towards the west to isolate South Africa is a recognition of this fact.
West reluctance has in major part been due to what we can call a new
cold war attitude. The west under the leadership cf Ronald Reagan, believe
that any radical disruption of the international status quo is masterminded
L
by the Soviet Union. From this belief comes the conclusion that any
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revolutionary movement of national liberation is Soviet inspired* The 
imposition of economic sanctions is in most western views seen as a threat
4
to the international capitalist system. The propaganda of a Soviet
design in Southern Africa has been recently been alluded to by Ian Smith.
In a conference in Washington he argued that the unrest in Squthern Africa
was mainly a Soviet campaign to take over South Africa and thus control
5
the strategic minerals found there.
In spite of western intransigence the move toward a positive 
direction has been obvious. This was clearly manifested in the Common- 
wealth communique of 1986. There was general agreement on the adoption 
of further substantial economic measures against South Africa. There 
was agreement to ban all air links with South Africa, a ban on new 
investment or re-investment of profits earned in South Africa.^ Further 
additions were a ban on all bank loans to South Africa, a ban on the 
import of Uranium, coal, iron and steel and withdrawal of all consular 
servcies.
Much as international opinion seem positive towards the isolation of 
the racist regime, there is still the question of practical implementation. 
Comentators like Paul Johnson posing as a British expert on modern history 
has argued that "...the current attempt to destroy the South African 
economy seems to me one of the most wicked things that has occurred in the 
world since the days of Hitler and Stalin." Mrs. Margaret Thatcher has
maintained that sanctions would not help bring about internal change in
^ #■
South Africa. These attitudes demonstrate the fact that agreeing to impose 
sanctions is completely different from implementation. For instance,
Mrs. Thatcher has agreed in principle with a sanctions package provision 
agreed upon by EEC leaders at their summit in The Hague in June 1985.
Demonstrating the contradictions, inherent in western government policies,
she proposed to put a voluntaryban on new investment in South Africa and
another voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. ' British
companies will not be forced to cease new investment, but mill be
*
exhosted, and persuaded to do so. Further, the Thatcher administration 
has refused tD withdraw its consular facilities from South Africa. It is 
argued that there are approximately 800,000 people in South Africa entitled 
to British passports -and thus making consular services indispensable.
Southern Africa Attitudes and .IMew Western Moves : Contradictions:
The issue of Western reluctance to impose complete sanctions is an
Dbvious one and goes a long way to shtfw the difficulties to be expected
in the attempt to bring about decolonization in South Africa. Of crucial
importance at the sametime are Southern African initiatives to impose
sanctions. Botha has challenged South Africa's neighbours who were urging
the EEC to impose sanctions to do so first. He boastfully asserted, "They
should have the courage of their convictions instead of continuing to enjoy
the considerable benefits of close association with South Africa while
0leaving it to others to pay the price of sanctions." From a regional and
international perspective, a Southern African initiative seem crucial.
some Southern African nationalists have alluded to a need for Southern
African member states to take an initiative. President Kaunda of Zambia
states that, "we must as fellow Africans help our brothers in South Africa.
And if in striving to ease their suffering we have to suffer too, then we 
9
will suffer..." It would be very encouraging if all the South African *
leaders shared the same sentiment. Theoretically, African political leaders 
supporting black nationalists have argued passionately that they are 
morally obliged to set anexample to the rest of the world by imposing or
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endorsing boycotts at what ever cost. Even the majority of political 
groupa within South Africa feel driven to demand for sanctions because 
nothing else seems to move the South African government which is either 
obdurate Or paralysed.
The most disquieting feature is that neither the Frontline states
nor the SADCC member states are united in the agitations for sanctions.
5uch a feature goes a long way in demonstrating the various responses
toward combatting forces of imperialism* It also points out to the
difficulties of achieving unity in Southern Africa at the face of
external divisive issues. Indeed Kaunda's cabinet minister* Alex
Chikwanda, was not exaggerating when he observed that, "Only Zambia and
Zimbabwe have the resolve to embark on sanctions. But these two
countries' action will be negated by the actions or breaches of
10neighbours, thereby rendering regional sanctions futile." The division
of the Frontline states and SADCC member states along the political
spectrum seem to have some relevance on their attitudes toward the
imposition of regional sanctions. While adamantly arguing against
sanctions, some seem (at least form their actions) to be willing
collaborates with the racist regime. Lesotho has in no uncertain terms
made her stand clear. On the 9th of July 1986, Lesotho's secretary for
Labour Mr. A.L. Thoahlane told South Africa's Minister of Manpower,
Mr. Pietie du Plesis that "A very large percentage of our gross national
product depends on remittances which are dependent on employment
opportunities in South Africa. Should there be a decline in employment,
11
it will haye an impaot an ub". Botswana and Mozambique have also 
indicated £heir reluctance.
The more conservative states of Malawi and Swaziland have uhraservedly
pronounced their unwillingness to isolate South Africa and infact have gone
further to collaborate on certain crucial areas. For instance Swaziland
accepted South African assistance in building a railway line through Swazi
territory linking the Eastern Transvaal with the port of Richards Bay.
The South African government duely made a supplementary R50 million payment 
12in 1982. Economically the move makes emminently good sense* For 
instance, Richards Bay would afford Swaziland's sugar an alternative to 
Maputo, which has not recovered form the ravages of the war of liberation.
It would also link all of Anglo-America's Swazi forestry products holdings 
with its processing facilities being built at Richards Bay. At the same 
time, this is a demonstration of a least firm commitment to economic 
liberation from South Africa. Infact in this respect Swaziland, a 
charter member of SADCC is moving counter to the organization's top 
priority of forging a transportation network independent of South Africa. 
Swaziland is by no means alone in these ambiguities, Botswana is aiming 
its own railroad across occupied Namibia to the Atlantic.
The above reactions have a very strong bearing on the icnreasing 
proposals for sanctions. It is high time that the Frontline states and 
SADCC member states make some soul searching. It would seem that theirs 
is a marrige of convenience which could easily crumble under the pressure 
of outside influence. As political and economic configurations, they seem 
to lack a united resolve to eliminate imperialism in the region. For a 
successful struggle against South African imperialism and decolonization 
the Frontline states and SADCC member states need to forge stronger bonds 
of unity. To successfully wage a sanctions war from a regional basis, there 
is a need for a strong resolve across the board, least we are accussed of 
demanding the outside world to give to our brothers in South Africa what we 
are denying them.
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It is encouraging to note that some leading uJestern nations are 
siouly responding to the call to isolate South Africa. This response is 
at the same time symbolic and cosmetic. As pointed out earlier, Britain 
haq responded with embargos on arms, oil exports, nuclear collaboration, 
withdrawal of military attaches, discouragement 'Of cultural and scientific 
agreements. The most important feature about the responses is that they 
carefully avoid economic issues which are viewed as counter.productive and 
potentially harmful to Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has been very quick ts 
point out that economic sanctions would hit hardest on Clacks and 
neighbouring economies.
There are prdsently painters to a deterioration in South Africa -
United States trade. In March 1966, the South African Commerce Department
lamented over what it called "strained trade relations between South Africa
13 '
and the United States." It is estimated that US exports to South Africa 
for 1985 fell sharply from $2,3 billion in 198V to $1,2 billion in 1985. 
This was a U7% decline. Much as this can be seen as a reflection of the 
ongoing economic reaerssion, it shows the growing unwillingness of US enter­
prises to do business with South Africa. Further more, the US Congress was 
able to pass the anti-apartheid act of 1986. There is also a drive among ’
■ t
liberal congreaemen to close loopholes that have emerged in the sanctions 
bill. \
Limited though these developments seem, they are unparalleled by any *
regional initiative in Southern Africa. All that seem to be happening
*
are developments toward limitting the effectiveness of sanctions. Indeed 
Botswana businessmen, and entrepreneurs in the mountain kingdoms of Lesotho 
and Swaziland are already gearing up to package South African fruit, fish 
and meat under internationally acceptable local labels for handsome 
sanctions - busting rewards. Limited western responses can make positive
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contributions towards pressurising the Pretoria regime to reform. It is 
estimated that limited sanctions as they are at present would reduce South 
African mineral"exports by about R1 billion, agricultural exports by
14
between R200 and R300 million, and service exports by about R1 billion.
This would in no way exert the necessary pressure to produce political as
well as social changes in South Africa. What is needed are longer and
/
stiffer sanctions which are presently anticipated. ''In this case, it is 
estimated that most agricultural and manufactured goods would be affected.
K
Furthermore, they would precipitate a 3096 drop in the countries mineral 
exports. The total Idss in monetary temps would be approximately. R13 
tillion. Econometrix analysts suggest that shortages of raw materials 
and intermediate goods for the manufacturing industry could develop. There
is therefore a need of a total strategy if the sanctions war would achieve
» 1 ' ■
the desired goals. All these point to the need for the Frontline states 
and 5ADCC member states to shift from theoretical assumptions to more 
practical ones. " - ,
The imposition of sanctions woold definately produce specific attitudes 
within South Africa. The South African government has warned that it will, 
never surrender to threats and sanctions, an attitude resembling that of
Ian Smith in Rhodesia, and reminiscent of Churchill during the Battle of
(
Britain. Sanctions will thus initially consolidate white South Africa in 
an adaptive reaction of collective defence against an outside world which 
appears hostile, this reaction will further be reinforced by a feeling of 
pride and satisfaction of surviving under pressure. Defiance will
i
definately acquire q positive connotation. The norms of a besieged 
country will quickly be imbibed by the young and enforced at school. These 
types of attitudes were clearly evident in Smith's Rhodesia. Frontline 
states and SADCC member states should not be discouraged by these early 
attitudes. To the South African states they should serve as pointers to a 
prolonged struggle which they must be prepared to wage.
On the other hand, sanctions though tending to contribute to the 
promotion of intransigence among South African whited, they will also promote 
political consciousness among Africans. The strength of sanctions will thus 
lie on their role as ad jjncts df African nationalism rather than as 
inducements to white reform. By serving to thwart economic growth, hasten 
the rundown of the infrastructure, create conditions of insecurity and
4
and business apprehension, and by facilitating unemployment in the African 
sector, with the subsequent migration,to freedom fighter ranks, sanations 
will serve as an adjunct to the growing assertion of the African population
s
v
for rights and political power. The Rhodesian experience clearly ,
demonstrated these factors and South Africa can be no exception.
A ' '
The main problem so far is that there seem to be a very strong voluntary
i
element in the proposals, and international cboperation is far ftom assured.
Such a development seem to be at the advantage of the South African government*
Previous experience of sanctions suggests that the technique of slowly applying
<
pressure overtime will give South Africa the opportunity to adjust and find
alternative outlets or suppliers, to (build new alliances, and to mobilize
domestic opinion. The lack of a forceful momentum will encourage South Africa */
to diversity its economy and resort to unconventional trade on a larger scale. 
There is therefore a great need for the implimentation of sanctions to take a 
more aggressive direction. This is especially true of the Southern African : 
states, which are presently in great need of a mechanism to show the world 
the right or desirable direction vis-a-vis the South African situation.
/
Counter Sanctions and Their Implications
The mast crucial issue concerning the Southern African independent states 
is that of counter-sanctions as a retaliatory measure by the South African 
regime/ Responding to the tough sanctions stand by Zambian President 
Kenneth Kaunda and Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, South Africa 
threatened that if Zambia and Zimbabwe continue asking for trouble they •
1U -
will. get. it. ^  The two states were further 'advised' not to harbour too 
many illusions about the west rescuing them from sanctions induced cala­
mity. Zimbabwe was further singled out as the main culprit and 'warned1 
that South Africa could strangle the country's economy in a matter of 
weeks should Robert Mugabe go ahead with his sanctions threat. These 
warnings have had a great impact on the propensity of some Southern African 
states to support the imposition of sanctions against South Africa let 
alone impose the sanctions themselves.
All the threats of counter sanctions are seen within the ranks of the 
South African ruling oligarchy as mechanisms of preserving what is called 
the "national interest". The South African government is already gearing 
up for tighter control aver,imports passing through its territory. All 
this seems to be directed against pro-sanctions African states. Zambia 
has already tasted this fate. South African authorities have implemented 
a customs clamp on all supplies flowing through South Africa to the land- 
blocked African statp. Essentially, a provisional payment or cash deposit, 
now has to be paid on all goods destined for Zambia. Forwading agents in 
South Africa refuse to lay put the millions of rands required because of
the risks involved. On the other hand,' Zambian importers are unable to
/
come up with, the money from their side because they lack foreign exchange. 
The result will be a severe shortage in Zambia of petrol, wheat, coal, 
clothing and tinned goods within a short period. These restrictions 
imposed by the South African Commissioner of Customs and Excise are a 
demonstration of the nature of counter-sanctions which the South African 
states-may have to face.
\
South Africa's counter-sanctions threats are based on a .
recognition of the degree to which the Southern African states are 
dependent on her. The Southern African Development coordination conference 
came into being mainly out of this recognition. It defined its principal
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objective as the reduction of external dependence and in particular 
dependence on the Republic of South Africa. It is thus crucial to note 
and appreciate the apprehension of the Southern African states toward 
sanctions and counter-sanctions. The greater the degree of dependence 
the less vocal they are in advocating for sanctions. For some of them 
like the former High Commissioner Territories to advocate for sanctions is 
seen as tantamount to committing suicide. Even the more vocal ones have
v ‘
shown less propensity to impose sanctions (that is if we disregard some 
of the rhetorical justifications which have been advanced). Realizing 
South Africa's dominance and preparedness to embark on counter-sanctions, 
South Africa's Minister of Manpower claimed that, "Southern Africa is like
a Zebra - if you damage the white parts then the black parts will naturally
17 .
also die." "
According to South African authorities Zimbabwe stands first in the 
line of fire. It is argued that the country's economy could be severely 
disrupted within a month if South Africa is stung into applying full scale 
retaliatory sanctions. In terms of volume it is estimated that 90% of 
Zimbabwe's trade passes through South Africa. More than 797 ODD tons of 
the countries' exports travel on South African railroutes. Furthermore, 
more than 1,2 million tons of Zimbabwean 'imports' are carried by South 
African railways. More than AA5,000 tons of the above figure were (in
1965) imports Zimbabwe desperately needed to keep its economy afloat.
/
More than Z$2WD million (R369 million at an exchange rate of Z$0,65 to the 
rand) or 16% of Zimbabwe's total exports end up in South Africa. Jt is 
further estimated that about 20% of Zimbabwe's imports originate in South 
Africa. Recent South African Transportation Services (SATS) statistics 
indicate that in 1985 there were abqut 2,500 South African Railway trucks- 
inZimbabwe and Botswana compared with only 918 Zimbabwean trucks on SATS 
lines. This illustrated the one way nature of the traffic.
these figures demonstrate Zimbabwe's heavy dependence on the' South 
African transportation network. With the rail link to Beira notoriously 
unstable because of inroads by anti-Frelimo insurgents sponsored by South 
Africa,, and the alternative port at Dar-es-Salaam congested and unreliable, 
Zimbabwe is caught in an intricate structure of dependence to.SATS. Mr. 
Mugabe has indicated that if South Africa retaliates with counter-sanctions 
by closing its borders all efforts will be madeito get the Maputo link into 
full operation. His concern on the issue is demonstrated by the deplDyement 
of more than .8 BOO Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique to flush out MI\IR rebels 
who sabotage communications with Zimbabwe.-
*
There are unfortunately still question marks on the capability of the 
ports of Beira and Maputo to handle Zimbabwean traffic. These ports 
currently carry 10% of Zimbabwe's exports. It is estimated that at best 
Mozambique can handle 40% of Zimbabwe's export. Observers have painted 
out that for this to happen, more than R3-billion is required to return 
Mozambique's transport to its former operating conditions. All these 
issues point to a crucial need to restructure the' country's transportation 
system to avoid dependence on South Africa. Some commentators argue that 
it will take two years, if funds are made available for upgrading Maputo 
port.facilities, before it can take 30% of Zimbabwe's exports.
Zambia is in no better condition. The majority of the country's
imparts pass through South Africa. Zambian traffic is worth' R18-million to'
i
SATS. The country is also highly dependend on trade routes through South 
Africa. Most of the imported goods are vital to the survival of the 
country's economy, these include things like foodstuffs, capital equipment, 
textile, medicine, and fuel.
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Regarding the former High Commissioner. Territories, the situation is
even more gloomy. Their dependence on .South Africa is overwhelming. This
dependence has further been reinforced by the itnergration of these
countries to South Africa's labour catchment area. As late as 1982,
1flapproximately 12,2A3 Swazi were recruited to South Africa. Lesotho had 
approximately 1A0 ODD of her citizens employed in different categories 
inside South Africa. In countries like Swaziland, whose geographical 
location and possibly political orientation has subjected her completely 
to South African domination, slight shifts within the South African 
Economy are immediately felt.
The degree of dependence thus become relevant to a country's commit-
(
ment to economic liberation from South Africa. It has great relevance on
I
perceived fears of South Africa's retaliatory counter-sanctions. Each
i
country's response to those issues quickly boils down from being an issue 
of theoretical assumptions to bread-and-butter issues. It is precisely at 
this point that the threat for cbunter-sanctions appear to have serious 
implications for the Frontline states block as a political configuration 
and SADCC as a regional organization aimed at achieving economic liberation 
from South Africa and other external fbrces of imperialism. The most 
crucial question is, does a demonstration of commitment or solidarity, to 
the Frontline states or SADCC has any relevance to a state's ability to
minimize the disastrous repercusions of counter-sanction on that particular
/
state? In other words, is there a mechanism or resource potential within 
the Frontline states block or SADCC to rescure a member state from being 
swept by the wave counter-sanctions? There is a great need for belonging
to these organizations to provide security measures. The fact that✓
belonging to the Frontline States or SADCC does not guarantee a state.against 
counter-sanctions is bound to produce cracks on the embryonic wall of
unity in Southern Africa. As long as states are circumstantially forced 
to respond to South African threats on an individual basis there is little
■ • s
hope of success in the efforts to eliminate or reduce South African 
deminance. As long as South Africa manages to deal with each state 
individually, then varying responses to imperialism cannot be eliminated
There is great need to appreciate the efforts made by nationalist 
leaders to birng about re-organization of regional structures through 
SADCC. This was a clear indication of the leaders' recognition of their 
vulnerability vis-a-vis their dependence on South Africa." This is a form 
of vulnerability which to a great extent limits their political options.
It is also encouraging to note that the international community is aware 
of the predicament Southern African Btates find themselves in. There is 
need to increase the intensity of efforts to achieve economic liberation 
from South Africa. . This was also expressed by the Secretary-General of 
the Commonwealth, Sir Shridah Ramphal who assured us that, "This assistance 
is being mobilized through the.Southern African Development coordination 
Conference. One of these is practical assistance to Zambia and Tanzania to 
upgrade the Tazara railways." - This shows a Commonwealth, anxiety to make
progress on the international front to dismantle^ apartheid.
' \ .
There has also been efforts made to help the countries neighbouring
South Africa loosen Pretoria's economic stranglehold. A group of Democ-
* ,
ratic and Republican senators and members of the House of Representatives 
in the United States introduced Bills that would provide US$ 100-million to 
the Frontline States, and a further US$ 700-million over a five-year period 
from the 1^8B fiscal year which started in October. The aid is meant to 
improve transportation and communication l^nks in the nations, thus helping 
them achieve economic independence from South Africa.
\There is no doubt that the Southern African transportation and
Communications sector needs a complete restructuring. There is no doubt
that the same sector should receive priority considerations. The goals . ’$■
of SADCC show too much prioritization of this sector. ' The emphasis placed
2Don it seem to be more than necessary. At the same time the projects 
presently undertaken seem to offer no radical change from.what existed 
during the colonial period. While they may go a long way in reducing 
dependence on South Africa, they seem to be re-infarcing old dependencies 
or substituting one set of dependencies with another. The projects .are 
infact reinforcing the much talked about disarticulated transportation 
systems inherited from colonialism. It must be noted that dependence and 
imperialism are just what they are irrespective of the actors. Any effort 
to eliminate dependency need to be radical and genuine. One wonders if 
SADCC donors would still be enthusiasti-c if the projects were no assurances 
of a continued Southern African economies' connection with western 
economies. Their reluctance to finance projects in Angola nad Mozambique 
must be a cause for concern.
The transportation improvements presently undertake by SADCC completely 
fall short of achieving regional integration which may bring about regional 
economic independence. Southern African economies are just as disintegrated 
as ever without any element of complementarity. It is therefpre necessary 
for SADCC to take a more progressive approach towards reducing dependency. 
There seem to be little use of narrowly interpreting dependency as 
basically that denoting the relationship between the economies of indepe­
ndent Southern African states and the South African economy. The main
characteristic of the colonial economy was that Southern African economies
21were vertically integrated upwards to metropolican economies. For the
-  15 -  .
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region to achieve economic independence, SADCC must aim at refashioning 
these links to produce horizontal ties between the Southern African states. 
This is obviously no easy task, because even the present willing donors 
will frustrate it.
The threat of counter-sanctions calls for the Southern African states 
to restructure their productive forces. This is especially so as regards 
the issue of food security. Some of the Southern African states have 
shown a chronic inability to produce enough to feed their own nationals. 
This has produced a high level of dependence on South Africa For food 
commodities. For instance, the market places of countries like Swaziland 
survive through retailing Sout^ i African food commodities. These include 
things like potatoes, tomatoes, and all kinds of fruits. In the event of 
counter-sanctions, the small entrepreneurs who make a living through 
retailing South African goods would go out of business. Further, 
thousands of consumers would have to dramically change their consumption 
patterns. This would definately be the problem faced by most states in 
the region. To successfully defend themselves- against counter-sanctions, 
these states must of necessity aim at food self-sufficiency. This in turn 
neccessitate the mobilization of resources toward improving productivity 
in the Rural areas.
x
Aims at increasing the productivity of the rural areas must be 
concrete, as against high sounding political slogans. In Swaziland the 
ex-Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini coined the slogan - Ekhaya - 
back to the rural areas. The aim of the policy was to encourage most 
Swazi ta go back to the rural areas to till the soil to increase food 
production which would consequently reduce the country's dependence on
South Africa. This was a policy enacted by a government with no resolve 
to make it a success. There was no mobilization of resources to enable 
the people to till the soil successfully. For all of the Southern 
African region, as long as there is dependence on South Africa for food, 
isolating South Africa will always be seen as tantamount to commiting 
suicide. It is therefore neccessary for SADCC as a vehicle for reducing 
dependence, to put mare emphases on food security.
The issue of sanctions and counter-sanctions need to be seriously 
considered by the Frontline states and SADCC member states. This- is 
especially true as regards political stability within each state. The 
greatest instrument in the hands of Africans to eliminate colonialism was 
-the inability of colonial governemnts to solve most economic ills. This 
tended to conscientize most Africans and thus increasing the ranks of 
politically relevant groups. Sanctions and counter-sanctions will 
definately lead to a number of shortages, the impact of which shall be, 
felt by the majority of the people. An unavoidable development would be 
the identification of the leadership with these problems. Any backlash 
will.neccessarily be viewed as a prbduct of their actions. To a large 
extent, there will be a growing desire to eliminate governments identified 
with the shortages brought by counter-sanctions.
Already the issue of sanctions has brought evident schisms within 
some governments. While Zimbabwe's ambassador to the United States, Mr. ' 
Edmond Garwe declared that Zimbabwe, "would declare sanctions against
S.A. within three months," such confidence was not very evident in 
Zimbabwe. In cabinet chambers, boardrooms, clubs and pubs, the mostly 
hostly debated issue is whether support for an economic blockade will
mean survival or suicide. In Zambia, serious cleavages have already been 
manifested. Zambian members of Parliament have continued tHeir attack an
-  17 -
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President Kaunda's declared intent to irtipnse sanctions against South 
23Africa. Several MP's Df the ruling United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) spoke out against sanctions. Rallying behind backbencher Laurence 
Sinyani, they expressed a fear that it would be suicidal for the govern­
ment to impose sanctions. Enock Kavindeie stated that, "Sanctions will
2kfinish us off because our economy is interwoven with South Africa."
These kinds of debates and sentiments are not limited to high ranking 
officials, but pevade even lower stratas of most Southern African societies. 
Some Zambians have suggested that the government put the sanctions issue to 
a referendum so that Zambians could state categorically whether or not they 
really want their country to impose sanctions against South Africa. If 
such a suggestion is adopted, it would go a long way in exonerating the 
leadership from blame in future if the sanctions backfired. This maybe 
a very useful suggestion for mot of the states. For those which have never 
bothered to consider public opinion to.decide and implement policy, this 
may be goad starting ground. Rather than leaders imposing their decisions 
they must receive the mandate from the people, lilhat ever decision would 
thus be to the interest of the peaple, and to a large extent avoiding a 
high scale of political instability which might aflict the region.
)
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Conclusion
This paper has shown that proposals for sanctions have always been 
frustrated by western reluctance which is based on the value of South 
Africa to western economies. The rising commitment to sanctions proposals 
on the part of the frontline states, and the emergence of SADCC as a 
regional organization, western reluctance has been minimally broken, tile 
have argued that the greatest drawback at the moment is the failure of 
Southern African states to impose regional sanctions to lead the rest of 
the world. Such a failure has resious implications an the commitment of 
the Frontline States and SADCC member states to isolate South Africa. Much 
of the failure is due to the political heterogeintly of the Southern 
African States. „
The poligical options of ,the Southern African States are limited by 
their degree of dependence to South Africa. There is therefore a need to 
reduce dependence.. We have argued that SADCC has a narrow interpretation 
of reducing dependency. All efforts are dircted toward liberation from 
South Africa's economic grip, while continuing to reinforce traditional 
dependencies. At the sametime SADCC and the Frontline states block, do 
not contain any form of security to member states in case of retaliations 
by South Africa. This further reduces the preparedness of each state to 
disassociate itself from South Africa. This makes the threat of counter- 
sanctions more penetrating and contribute to the growth of differences 
between the Southern African states.
/
There is great need in Southern Africa for economic restructuring 
with the aim of achieving regional self-sufficiency. This does not mean 
the construction of closed economies, but economies which are not completely
subordinated to either South African Or western imperialism. Within the 
present structures sanctions and counter-sanctions may lead to widespread.
political instability.
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